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MEDIATION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Divorce ...isa matter of the heart and of the law. The strong
emotional forces accompanying the dissolution of an existing
family relationship require more delicately wrought measures
than can be provided in a court-imposed solution. Mediation can
help educate parents about each other's needs and the needs of
their children and can provide a personalized model for dispute
resolution both at the time of divorce and in the future, should
circumstances change or differences arise. Mediation can help
parents learn to work together, isolate the issues to be decided
and realize that cooperation can be of mutual advantage.'
In 1991, Wyoming joined a growing number of states2 in adopting
legislation providing for mediation as an alternative method of dispute resolution. 3 The Wyoming Mediation Act4 defines "mediation",
and other related terms,' imposes general rules for confidentiality'
and privilege,' and provides mediator immunity from civil liability for
good faith acts or omissions.'
In keeping with the spirit of Wyoming's Mediation Act, the Wyoming Supreme Court amended Rule 40, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40), to include alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures.1 The court stated that it had determined it was
1. Jay H. Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 413, 418-19 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
2. See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-301 to -311 (1989); OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, §§
12-1801 to -1813 (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.100 to .210 (1991).
3. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-43-101 to -104 (Supp. 1991).
4. Id. See APPENDIX A for the complete text of Wyoming's Mediation Act.
Prior to adoption of the Wyoming Mediation Act, several Wyoming statutes already provided for dispute resolution alternatives to traditional litigation in certain
situations. See WYo. STAT. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1991) (automobile consumers must first
avail themselves of a manufacturer's informal dispute settlement procedure before
pursuing other remedies, if such procedure exists and is in compliance with federal
law); WYo.STAT. §§ 11-41-101 to -110 (1989) (Agriculture Mediation Service Act); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 11-19-106 to -108 (1989) and § 11-28-108 (1989) (provides for arbitration in
certain farm-related claims); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988) (Wyoming's version
of the Uniform Arbitration Act); and WYo. STAT. §§ 27-10-105 to -107 (1991) (provides
an arbitration procedure to resolve disputes between public employers and fire
fighters).
5. WYO.STAT. § 1-43-101(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991).

6. Id. § 1-43-101(a).
7. Id. § 1-43-102.
8. Id. § 1-43-103.
9. Id. § 1-43-104.
10. Order Amending Rule 40, W.R.C.P. for the Adoption of Rules for Alternative
Dispute Resolution Procedures, 812-817 Wyoming Reporter XIX (1992) (Adopted by
the Wyoming Supreme Court on August 2, 1991 and effective October 29, 1991-sixty
days after publication in the Pacific Reporter advance sheets) [hereinafter Order
Amending Rule 40].
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40, as amended and previously adopted by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, was readopted without change on December 20, 1991. At that time the Court
considered and, with some revision, adopted by Court order the proposed Revised Wy-
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"necessary and proper to establish rules for alternative dispute resolution procedures as an optional method for parties to use in lieu of
judicial resolution of disputes . . . "" and thus created subsections (b)
through (f) to Rule 40.12 These recent legislative and judicial actions
govern mediation procedures in the broad arena of Wyoming civil
litigation. 3
The purpose of this article is to provide a brief conceptual overview of mediation 4 in the domestic relations context.15 The article examines what effect the new Wyoming statutes and rules may have
within the narrow context of divorce, child custody, visitation, support
and property settlement issues in domestic relations cases."6 This, in
turn, raises a number of questions regarding the practicality and current viability of domestic mediation in Wyoming.17 A primary objec-

oming Rules of Civil Procedure as recommended by the Permanent Rules Advisory
Committee-Civil Division. See Order Adopting the Revised Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure, as filed with the Clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court (December 20,
1991).
11. Order Amending Rule 40, supra note 10.
12. See APPENDIX B for the relevant amendments to Wvo. R. Civ. P. 40.
13. Wyoming's recent statutory and rule changes providing for mediation explicitly do not preclude the use of other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Nor do the statutes and rules suggest that a single, uniform mediation procedure be
followed in all cases. The use of different types of mediation procedures or other ADR
techniques may be appropriate depending on the circumstances in a particular case.
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40(f) recognizes other possible choices for ADR procedures including
arbitration and summary jury trials.
14. See generally NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
MEDIATION AND THE LAW § 1.04 (1987).
15. By 1990, more than one-half of the states have adopted legislation providing
for various types of ADR in domestic cases. John R. Price & Kendall Woods, Legislation on Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. STANDING COMMIT'TEE ON Disp. RESOL. 116-17
(1990). For examples of legislation from neighboring states, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 1410-129.5(I)(c) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-811 (1991) and §§ 40-3-101 to -127
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2901 to -2920 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-16.2 (1989).
16. This article in not intended to present and thus does not discuss non-domestic
relations situations where mediation might be appropriate.
17. Many of the questions raised are answered within this article. However, the
authors acknowledge that the unpredictability and uncertainty connected with a relatively new and untested process leaves other questions unanswered. For the most part,
these questions will remain unanswered until enough Wyoming attorneys become convinced that mediating a divorce or other domestic issue offers significant potential
benefits to both the divorcing parties and the attorneys themselves. The gains of going
ahead and mediating must be perceived as being greater than the costs (financial and
otherwise) of resolving domestic issues through the traditional adversarial process. Researchers have summarized the role of the legal profession in this regard as follows:
[W]e find that despite professional enthusiasm for divorce mediation and the
rapid recent proliferation of public and private mediation services, voluntary programs typically fail to attract large numbers of clients. Although divorce mediation is somewhat more attractive to better-educated individuals, who are traditionally more receptive to new ideas, the use of divorce mediation programs
remains tied to the attitudes of the legal community. Individuals whose attorneys
are ambivalent or opposed to mediation are very reluctant to try it. This underscores the importance of obtaining the support and cooperation of attorneys in
developing and popularizing mediation.
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research Results,
19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 451, 479 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
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tive of this article is to encourage members of the Wyoming Bar to
recognize appropriate cases for mediation and to further explore how
and when voluntary domestic mediation might best be utilized." In
this regard, the article emphasizes potential ethical concerns and concludes by recommending statewide adoption of uniform standards of
practice for Wyoming mediators. Ideally, this article presents an introductory discussion of legal and ethical issues indigenous to the mediation process and is intended to provide a greater appreciation for
both the potential effectiveness as well as the likely drawbacks of mediating domestic relations cases.' 9

II.

DOMESTIC MEDIATION DEFINED

One commentator defines mediation as "a cooperative process
through which the parties themselves fashion a mutually acceptable
resolution to their dispute with the help of a neutral third party. Mediation is essentially a negotiation process that seeks a convergence
among the parties rather than the polarization that characterizes liti-

Only when mediation has been attempted in a significant number of Wyoming domestic
relations cases will evidence become available to ascertain the viability and practicality of
the process.
18. The 1992 Wyoming Legislature recently considered but failed to introduce a
proposed mediation bill sponsored by the Select Committee on Health Care. As proposed, the bill would have implemented pre-trial nonbinding mediation procedures for
most civil cases. H.B. 34, 51st Leg., Spec. & Budg. Sess. (1992). Entitled "Mandatory
Nonbinding Mediation," the proposed bill would have allowed a district court judge to
assign civil cases for mediation prior to trial if the case did not involve a prayer for
equitable relief and if mediation "is in the best interests of justice." Id. The bill also
would have required the presiding judge to assign the case for mediation upon the
stipulation of all parties. It would appear that the title of the bill was somewhat misleading since the proposed bill provided certain exceptions when mediation would not
be mandatory.
It is recognized that statutorily-imposed mandatory mediation would require a
new set of pretrial procedures and practices for Wyoming lawyers. Extensive discussion of the complexities and potential drawbacks of mandatory mediation is, however,
beyond the scope of this article. However, for commentary critical of mandatory mediation in the domestic context, see generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) [hereinafter Grillo]. The author concludes:
Although mediation can be useful and empowering, it presents some serious process dangers that need to be addressed, rather than ignored. When mediation is
imposed rather than voluntarily engaged in, its virtues are lost. More than lost:
mediation becomes a wolf in sheep's clothing. It relies on force and disregards the
context of the dispute, while masquerading as a gentler, more empowering alternative to adversarial litigation. Sadly, when mediation is mandatory it becomes like
the patriarchal paradigm of law it is supposed to supplant. Seen in this light,
mandatory mediation is especially harmful: its messages disproportionately affect
those who are already subordinated in our society, those to whom society has already given the message, in far too many ways, that they are not leading proper
lives.
19. Although this article identifies and briefly discusses various "model" procedures for conducting a mediation, infra note 40, it is not intended as a primer on how
to conduct a domestic relations mediation. Nor is it intended to promote mediation as
a panacea for the varied problems in traditional adversarial domestic relations dispute
resolution.
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gation." ° Divorce mediation"' is similarly defined as "an attempt at
mutual problem solving in which couples try to reach agreement on all
of the issues in the primary areas of dispute in a divorce: property
settlement, child custody and support, and spousal maintenance. 22
Although mediation is sometimes confused with other forms of alternative dispute resolution such as conciliation2 and arbitration 24 it is
20. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S5, S7 (1989).
21. "Domestic mediation" and "divorce mediation" are used interchangeably in
this article. For purposes of clarification, however, "divorce mediation" can be read
narrowly to only include mediation connected with the actual divorce proceeding
whereas "domestic mediation" may include pre-divorce, divorce and post-divorce attempts at mediation.
22. Steven C. Bowman, Comment, Idaho's Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26
IDAHO L. REV. 547, 553 (1990) (citing AM. JUR. 2D, New Topic Service: Alternative Dispute Resolution 15-16 (1985)).
23. Conciliation:
contemplate[s] a process during which the spouses have one or more conferences
with someone usually referred to as a counselor, [and] the assumption is that the
spouses are to discuss their marital differences in the presence of and with the
participation of the counselor. The function of the counselor is to use the techniques developed in psychology or psychiatry or similar disciplines in such a fashion as to cause them to resume marital life together or, failing that, perhaps to
cause them to agree on such matters as property, support and custody of children.
HOMER

H. CLARK, JR.. 2 THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 15.12, at

154 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CLARK].
Professor Clark identifies a fundamental problem with attempting either voluntary or
involuntary conciliation in a divorce proceeding:
When the parties have reached the point of seriously considering divorce, it is
usually too late for counseling or conciliation to succeed in saving the marriage.
To be really effective, a conciliation program should be made available to spouses
long before divorce is contemplated, but of course that would require a very large
expenditure of public funds. On consideration of all these factors, one is led to be
skeptical of any very ambitious claims for conciliation, although it may help some
couples either to save their marriages or to reduce the material and psychological
damage of their divorces.
Id. at 155-56 (footnotes omitted).
WYo.STAT. § 1-43-101(a)(ii) (1988) incorporates "reconciliation, settlement, compromise
or understanding" in its definition of "mediation." Unlike a number of other states, however, Wyoming neither mandates nor provides statutory authority for voluntary pre-divorce
conciliation. See generally CLARK, supra note 23.
24. Arbitration "occurs when the parties to a controversy agree to submit it to an
impartial third person for a decision based upon evidence and argument." CLARK,
supra note 23, at 165. Unlike mediation (where the parties are ultimately responsible
for developing the agreement, if any, which results from the mediation process), an
arbitrator has responsibility for making a final recommendation or decision. Depending on the nature of the parties' arbitration agreement, the arbitrator's decision may
be either advisory or binding. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 1.03. Consequently,
selection of an arbitrator is probably more important than the selection of a mediator
since the arbitrator generally has a much greater influence on the end result.
State courts have said that arbitration is a "favored remedy" in resolving domestic
issues. For example, in Flaherty v. Flaherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. 1984), the New
Jersey Supreme Court cited numerous advantages of domestic arbitration including:
reduced court congestion, the opportunity for resolving sensitive matters in an informal and private setting, reduced trauma and anxiety (as opposed to marital litigation),
and minimized polarization of the parties. The court reserved its role as parens patriae with regard to the children involved and indicated it would be guided by the
traditional "best interests of the child" principle. These same conditions and potential
advantages would seem to apply equally well in the domestic mediation context.
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distinctly different in both its intended purpose and methodology.

III.
A.

THE DOMESTIC MEDIATION PROCESS

The Parties

Conceptually, domestic mediation generally involves either a married couple actively seeking a divorce2 5 or a divorced couple attempting to mediate a divorce-related issue such as modification of child
custody or visitation.28 The couple voluntarily involve an impartial
mediator or team of mediators chosen by mutual agreement of the
parties to assist in deciding on and drafting a formal written agreement which disposes of all substantive issues. 27 Mediation sessions are
usually held in a location away from the courthouse and at some point
in time preceding a district court judge's active participation in the
case. If a mediated agreement is reached, it is reduced to writing and
presented to the district court for final approval. 2 In this sense, a successful voluntary mediated divorce does not differ significantly from
the end result in an amicable and uncontested, judicially-supervised
divorce proceeding in which the parties stipulate to the disposition of
all divorce issues including custody, support, and property.29
There is, however, an important distinction between contested divorces and mediated divorce proceedings when minor children are involved in the familial relationship. For example, when children are in-

25. Regardless of whether or not the divorcing couple submits to voluntary mediation, grounds of "irreconcilable differences in the marital relationship" are the primary
basis for which a Wyoming divorce may be granted. WYo. STAT. § 20-2-104 (1987).
26. See generally Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child-Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. LQ. No. 4, 469 (1984); Linda K. Girdner,
Adjudication and Mediation: A Comparison of Custody Decision-Making Processes
Involving Third Parties,8 J. Div. No. 3 , 33 (1984-85); see also 2 FAM. MEDIATOR (No.
2, Mar.-Apr. 1982) (reporting former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger's recommendations that child custody matters be resolved by alternative means of settlement such as mediation or arbitration rather than through the courts).
27. ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES § 4.01 (1983).
28. The parameters of court enforcement of mediated agreements are an unsettled
question in many jurisdictions. Steven Weller, Court Enforcement of Mediated Agreements: Should Contract Law be Applied?, 31 JUDGES' J., 13 (Winter, 1992). Weller
suggests that judicial enforcement under traditional principles of contract law may
have some drawbacks due to: the potential for lack of mutual assent; the possibility of
the mediator unduly influencing one or both of the parties; and, the difficulty in challenging a mediated agreement on the basis of its formation due to statutorily imposed
confidentiality. Id. at 14-16. Weller proposes adoption of a rule governing judicial review of mediated agreements which might alleviate some of these problems. Id. at 39.
See generally Appelt v. Appelt, 768 P.2d 596 (Wyo. 1989) (divorcing couple agreed to
divide marital property and then memorialized that agreement in a document
presented to the district court for inclusion in the divorce decree); Foster v. Foster, 768
P.2d 1038 (Wyo. 1989) (discusses the district court's constitutional and statutory obligations to conduct an on-the-record independent review of the evidence and findings
supporting a court commissioner's recommendation in a domestic relations case).
29. CLARK, supra note 23, at 163. See also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
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volved in a traditional court-supervised divorce proceeding, the "best
interest of the child" is the paramount standard which guides most
judicial decision making.30 Although children are generally not given
"party" status in judicially-supervised contested divorce proceedings,31 their interests are foremost in the court's thoughts.
On the other hand, children whose parents rely on domestic mediation to resolve divorce issues may not receive the same attention
and protection as children whose parents obtain an adjudicated divorce.3" Several commentators have noted that the exclusion of children from mediated divorce proceedings may result in a less-thanfavorable long-range outcome for children. Even though a judge is
required to approve a mediated settlement agreement, it does not necessarily follow that the judge will be as well-informed and familiar
with the children's interests as a judge would be in an adjudicated
proceeding.3 4 This raises a critical question as to whether a mediator
is or should be responsible for guaranteeing that a mediated settlement agreement protects the children's interests.
On one hand, married parents are permitted wide latitude in
making decisions about their children's "best interests." The argument follows that divorce should not necessarily give rise to thirdparty interference with parental decision-making. 35 On the other

30. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 20-2-112(b) (Supp. 1991); WYo. STAT. § 20-5-104(a)(ii)

and (iv) (1987).
31. Wyoming does not require appointment of a guardian ad litem in a divorce
proceeding. Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo. 1990); see also Moore v. Moore,
809 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1991) (defining the role of a guardian ad litem as an advocate for
the child).
32. By definition under Wyoming Statutes section 1-43-101(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991), a
child is not "rendered mediation services by a mediator ... with a view to obtaining
mediation services" and thus is not a "party to the mediation." Id.
33. See, e.g., Gary Paquin, Protectingthe Interests of Children in Divorce Mediation, 26 J. FAM. L. 279 (1987-88); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented
but not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U.L. REv. 76
(1984).
34. While not intended to cast aspersions on the efforts and dedication of Wyoming's district court judges, the simple fact remains that crowded court dockets impose practical constraints on the amount of time a judge is likely to spend reviewing a
mediated settlement agreement. Consequently, there is some risk that the "best interests of the children" may not receive a thorough judicial review when both parents
present the court with a settlement agreement. See generally Folberg, supra note 1, at
434-35.
35. Professor Folberg suggests that courts should not have any authority to interfere with parental decisions regarding custody if the parents can agree with each other
as to proper disposition. He summarizes:
Some readers may be alarmed by the suggestion to allow divorcing parents to resolve custody issues without judicial review and may argue that the state has a
responsibility for the children beyond encouraging the speedy, private settlement
of disputes between parents. The state, however, under the well-developed doctrine of parens patriae, has a responsibility for the welfare of children only when
parents cannot agree or cannot adequately provide for them. Divorce mediation
begins with the premise that parents love their children and are best able to decide how, within their resources, they will care for them.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/8

8

Gibbard and Hartmeister: Mediation and Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases - Practical Consid
1992,

MEDIATION

hand, a deteriorating, highly emotional and/or contentious relationship between divorcing or divorced parents is often not conducive to
rational thought. Assuming that a mediated settlement agreement will
receive minimal scrutiny by an approving court, the counter-argument
can thus be made that, in the absence of a guardian ad litem, only the
mediator can ensure that children's interests are protected. 6
B.

The Mediator(s)

A variety of professionals from a number of different disciplines
may participate in domestic mediation. 37 Psychologists, family therapists, counselors, social workers and attorneys may all be involved in
mediating domestic disputes and each may serve in the role of mediator either individually or as a member of a co-mediator team."8 The
mediation process varies considerably depending upon the experience
of the mediator(s) and the format adopted for the mediation sessions.3 A variety of mediation "models" exist which may be used in
resolving an appropriate domestic dispute."0

When both parents love their children and are able to agree on how to provide for
them after divorce, it is presumptuous and intrusive to allow a third party,
whether a judge or a child development expert, to determine if the parents' custody, support and care agreement is adequate for their own children. A mediated
agreement is much more likely than a judicial decision to match the parents' capacity and desires with the child's needs.
Folberg, supra note 1, at 437-38 (footnotes omitted).
Wyoming's 1989 adoption of statutory child support guidelines raises an important
question of whether a district court could ever justify approval of a mediated settlement
agreement which deviates from the guideline dollar amounts. WYo. STAT. §§ 20-6-301 to -306
(1991). WYO. STAT. § 20-6-302(b) states that "[a] court may deviate from the child support
guidelines established by W.S. 20-6-304 if it issues a written finding or specific finding on
the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case." This statute would appear to prohibit judicial acceptance of child support
amounts in a mediated agreement absent at least some review of the underlying
circumstances.
36. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 27, § 4.02; see generally Janet Maleson Spencer
& Joseph P. Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal For Private Resolution of
Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911 (1976).
37. HARALAMBIE, supra note 27, § 4.03; see also the related discussion, infra notes
106-111 and accompanying text.
38. HARALAMBIE, supra note 27, § 4.03; see also Bowman, supra note 22, at 554-57.
39. CLARK, supra note 23, at 164. Under optimal conditions, mediating a relatively
simple single-issue domestic dispute could be accomplished in a single mediation session. For example, it is possible an agreement between a custodial and non-custodial
parent scheduling the next year's calendar for child visitation might be accomplished
in a single session. It is unlikely, however, that a single mediation session would suffice
to resolve the multiple issues involved in a complicated divorce case.
40. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 20, at S6-S20 (Feinberg Mediation Procedure);
CLARK, supra note 23, at 164 (Structured Mediation); Spencer & Zammit, supra note
36, at 930-38 (Mediation-Arbitration model); Susan M. Brown, Models of Mediation,
DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 49-52 (James C. Hansen & Sarah Childs Grebe eds.,
1985) (Therapeutic Model); JOAN BLADES. FAMILY MEDIATION 111-25 (1985) (Comediation).
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C. The Mediation Process
In simplest terms, mediating a domestic relations case will usually
include the following stages: 4
1. Initial Communication: the mediator42 will confer with both
parties to establish a convenient time for an initial appointment."'
2. First Session: the mediator begins by welcoming the parties
and then attempts to establish credibility by explaining the ground
rules for the proceedings." Depending on the issues at stake and the
parties' familiarity with mediation, the mediator may need to demystify certain aspects of the process. After visiting with the parties and
determining such things as the complexity of the issues and the emotionalism of the parties, the mediator must decide whether these particular parties and their issues are appropriate for mediation."' The
mediator should stress the necessity for full consent and disclosure,"
and explain the importance of confidentiality.4 7 Similarly, the mediator should discuss his/her role as a neutral third-party" and clarify
the objectives for conducting the mediation. Finally, allocation of
costs for mediator reimbursement should be discussed and agreed to if
not provided for in some other fashion.49
41. One feature of the mediation process is that no two mediations are ever conducted in exactly the same way. Mediation depends on flexibility. It is a dynamic process created by the relationships between the parties and each other, the parties and
the mediator, and the strategic decisions the mediator and the parties make during the
course of mediation. Consequently, thinking of the mediation process in terms of
"stages" issimply one way of conceptualizing the process as a whole. See also ROBERTA
S. MITCHELL & SCOT E. DEWHIRST, THE MEDIATOR HANDBOOK, (1990) (a mediator training guide which adopts a seven-stage mediation model).
42. Though phrased in terms of a single mediator, the same process will probably
not vary significantly if co-mediators are employed.
43. Patricia L. Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Nonadversarial Procedure for the
No-Fault Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615, 635 (1980-81).
44. Id.
45. HARALAMBIE, supra note 27, § 4.04.
46. Winks, supra note 43, at 635; CLARK, supra note 23, at 165.
47. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 2.04[B]; see also CLARK, supra note 23, at
165.
48. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 2.04[B].

49. Wvo. R. CIv. P. 40(d) states that in court-assigned mediations in which a suit

has been filed, a person other than an active judge serving as a mediator:
shall be compensated from available public funds for services performed in a particular case at a rate of not less than $50.00 per hour. The person to be compensated shall submit to the clerk of the supreme court a statement of fees for services rendered, together with the report required by subsection (e).
Wyo. R. Ctv. P. 40(d).
In situations where a case has not been filed in court but has been accepted for settlement conference or mediation by the parties, a $15.00 filing fee is required to be paid to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court if the parties seek to utilize the Court's list of potential
mediators. Mediator compensation in those cases is arranged by agreement between the parties and the mediator and must be paid by the parties within 30 days of receipt of the
mediator's statement. Id.
By letter dated February 10, 1992, Wyoming Supreme Court Justice G. Joseph Cardine
notified the district court judges in the state that the court was imposing a $300.00 cap on
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Next, both parties are encouraged to make separate, uninterrupted statements outlining their concerns and feelings." Depending
on the emotional levels involved and the possible reluctance of one or
both parties to be candid, it may be necessary to meet separately or
caucus with the parties to fully identify all problems and concerns."
The mediator attempts to prioritize issues, encourages a bargaining
and communicative relationship, and stresses the common points
upon which the parties might reach agreement.2
3. Follow Up Sessions: generally, domestic mediation sessions are
not conducted in marathon fashion. Instead, they are scheduled on a
weekly basis to last for one to two hours each.5 3 As long as unresolved
issues remain but the parties mutually agree that progress is being
made, it is feasible to continue meeting on a regular basis.
4. The Written Agreement: as progress is made, the mediator
summarizes areas of common understanding and assists the parties in
drafting a final written agreement.5 The complexity of the written
agreement will vary depending on the nature of the legal issues involved. 5 It is always advisable to have both parties seek independent
legal advice before final agreement is reached unless both parties were
fully represented by counsel throughout the course of the mediation
proceedings." This holds true regardless of whether or not the mediator is an attorney.57 Even if the parties fail to reach a final agreement
it may be possible to salvage the positive results of mediation by having the parties stipulate to the agreed-upon issues.""
D.

Potential Advantages of Mediation for the Parties

Various commentators have written about the values and merits
of mediation in general, and domestic mediation in particular. 9 Prothe amount that the court will reimburse mediators for expenses and services in future mediations. The court imposed the cap due to the rapid depletion of the $9,000 amount provided by the 1991 Wyoming Legislature to fund the ADR program. In his letter, Justice
Cardine, who also serves as Chairman of the Wyoming Supreme Court's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Committee, reminded the judges that all mediator services had been provided
pro bono when the state's ADR program was begun and he implied that a return to that
standard might be necessary in the future.
Commentators have discussed the importance of adequate public funding for ADR programs. See, e.g, Frank E.A. Sander, Paying for ADR, A.B.A. J. 105 (Feb. 1992).
50. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 2.04[C].
51. Id.
52. Winks, supra note 43, at 635-37.
53. CLARK, supra note 23, at 164.
54. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 2.04[E].
55. Id.
56. See in/ra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
57. Winks, supra note 43, at 635. In fact, encouraging the parties to seek outside
legal counsel prior to signing a final agreement is probably even more critical from a
liability standpoint when the mediator is an attorney. See infra notes 170-172 and
accompanying text.
58. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 2.04[E].
59. See, e.g., Jay H. Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, re-
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ponents have compiled a lengthy list of advantages which include: mediation's informality,60 flexibility, 61 and voluntary, non-binding nature;"2 the fact that, at least in theory, mediation is less disruptive and
leads to more amicable post-crisis relationships;13 a better record of
voluntary compliance with mediated agreements than with judiciallyimposed solutions;6" the value of self-determination; 2 the reduced
likelihood of relitigation;6 6 less delay than in the traditional judicial
process; 7 and the claim that mediation is cost-effective and thus
cheaper than traditional adversarial litigation."8
E. Potential Disadvantages of Mediation for the Parties
Although the list of perceived disadvantages to mediating a domestic dispute is not as lengthy as the list of advantages, the qualitative significance should not be overlooked." Depending upon the circumstances in any particular case, potential disadvantages may
include: the possibility of unequal bargaining power as between the
parties;7" the potential that if mediation fails, the position of the parties will harden; the need for refinements in professional standards,
mediator training and licensing procedures; 7' and significant dispute
as to whether mediation is truly more cost-effective and less expensive

printed in JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, 706-07 (2d ed. 1985):
Mediation can educate the parties about each other's needs and provide a personalized model for dispute resolution, both now and in the future should circumstances change or differences arise.
This advantage of mediation exists, in part, because mediation is less bound by
rules of procedure and substantive law, as well as certain assumptions or norms,

that dominate the adversarial process. The ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the parties themselves and they may fashion a unique solution that will
work for them without being strictly governed by precedent nor concerned with
the precedent they may set for others.
Parents should have the first opportunity to meet the needs of their children and
continue the maintenance of family ties without state interference.
The legal system is not well able to supervise or enforce the fragile and complex
interpersonal relationships between family members that continue even after most

divorces.
60. Feinberg, supra note 20, at $8-$9.
61. Id. at $9-SI; Steven T. Knuppel, Comment, Promise and Problems in Divorce Mediation, 1 J. Disp. RESOL., 128 (1991) [hereinafter Knuppel].
62. Feinberg, supra note 20, at S7.
63. Bowman, supra note 22, at 558.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Knuppel, supra note 61, at 128.
68. Feinberg, supra note 20, at S10-S12.
69. CLARK, supra note 23, at 163.
70. ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 14, § 6.03; Bowman, supra note 22, at 559.
71. John A. Fiske, Divorce Mediation: An Attractive Alternative to Advocacy, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 55, 62 (1986).
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than traditional adversarial litigation.72
F.

The Current Status of Domestic Mediation in Wyoming

A random, informal and decidedly unscientific survey of attorney
members of the Wyoming State Bar's Panel of Mediators and a similar survey of members of the Wyoming State Bar indicates that there

has been little movement toward expanding the use of mediation in
the domestic relations context. " Although almost all of the attorneys
from both groups that were surveyed knew of the new Wyoming stat-

utes and rules governing mediation, not a single respondent from the
Panel of Mediators indicated actual experience as a mediator in a domestic case. In addition, none of the Bar respondents had experience
representing clients who had attempted domestic mediation. Even
though these results are by no means conclusive, it is clear that domestic mediation has not yet been widely embraced in Wyoming.
Most of the attorneys interviewed did, however, express interest in
the process and enthusiasm for its potential.
Comparable results were also observed in the use of mediation in

the first six months since the inception of the Wyoming Supreme
Court's mediation program in August, 1991." In that period, 17 final
72. For an excellent critique of mediation in the domestic context, see CLARK,
supra note 23, at 162-74.
Mediation has been the subject of extensive commentary during the 1980's, most
of it emphasizing mediation's assumed benefits, much of it superficial rather than
critical or analytical.
The continued currency of these cliches is puzzling in view of the well established
fact that even before the advent of mediation a very large proportion of divorce
cases were uncontested, the function of the courts in such cases being merely to
approve arrangements already worked out by the parties and their lawyers.
It also seems clear that a full disclosure of material information by both spouses is
essential to effective mediation, but the available writing on mediation leaves
largely unclear just how intervention by the mediator is permissible in order to
ensure a full disclosure (with examples).
Id. at 162, 165 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Folberg also raises several excellent points about the possible downside to
domestic mediation. He states, "[t]he very elements that make divorce mediation so appealing and provide its advantages over the adversarial model also create certain dangers and
raise substantial issues not yet resolved." Folberg, supra note 59, at 707. The unresolved
issues he discusses include: the difficulty in weighing and blending emotional feelings with
legal rights and obligations; the fact that mediation does not provide the precise checks and
balances that are the principal benefit of the adversarial process; and the concern that
many, including mental health professionals, attorneys and judges, may not be eager to relinquish their traditional roles during tight economic times in the growing divorce industry.
Id. at 707-08.
73. Between December, 1991 and February, 1992, the authors informally contacted various attorney members of the Wyoming State Bar's Panel of Mediators as
well as members of the Wyoming State Bar for their input and thoughts regarding the
use of mediation in domestic relations cases.
74. With financial assistance from the Wyoming legislature, the Wyoming Supreme Court created a settlement conference and mediation program concurrently
with its adoption of amended Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40, in August, 1991. See supra note 10.
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reports and bills for reimbursement were submitted to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. PRO. 40(d).7" Not one of
the 17 cases involved an attempt at mediating a domestic dispute. In
fact, it appears that all
17 cases involved settlement conferences
76
rather than mediation.
Consequently, it is far too early to determine whether or not domestic mediation is a practical alternative to traditional adversarial
adjudication in Wyoming domestic relations cases. All that can be
said with certainty is that domestic mediation does not appear to have
been widely accepted to date and more results are needed before valid
predictions can be made as to its viability and potential for future use
in Wyoming. However, because of the potential benefits of mediation
in the domestic context and the likelihood that mediation will be used
with greater frequency in the future, the significant role of ethical
concerns as they relate to members of the Wyoming Bar are examined
to illustrate potential problems.
IV.
A.

ETHICAL CONCERNS

Background

In an early, path-breaking article,77 attorney Richard E. Crouch
discussed the "tough ethical issues" which face an attorney78 involved
in mediation. Crouch perceived ethical problems for the attorney who
sought to fulfill the aspirations of mediation within the ethical parameters of the legal profession. He chiefly criticized the concept that the
attorney-mediator can "represent" both parties and still manage to be
"neutral" as between them.
Crouch pointed out that the ostensibly neutral attorney-mediator
is often caught in the dilemma of whether to let a weaker party to the
75. Interview with Jerrill Carter, Clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Feb. 27, 1992); see also supra note 49.
76. In each of the 17 cases the person conducting the "settlement conference"
submitted a written recommendation to the parties, to the assigning court, and/or to
the Wyoming Supreme Court at the conclusion of the ADR session. By definition, mediation would not entail a mediator making a recommendation but, rather, would only
involve the mediator in assisting the parties to draft a written agreement reflecting the
common understanding reached by the parties. While a mediator could submit a written report detailing the results and degree of successfulness of the mediation, by definition such a report would not constitute a recommendation to either the parties or
the supervising court. The report of disposition required under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 40(e)
only requires that the Clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court be notified as to whether
or not the parties reached a settlement; it does not require disclosure of any sensitive
or confidential information.
77. Richard E. Crouch, The Dark Side is Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. ADvoc. 27
(1982).
78. This article deals with ethical difficulties which face the individual attorney
who mediates a domestic relations dispute. There are, of course, other models involving more than one attorney, co-mediators, or an attorney-therapist team. See supra
note 40. The ethical concerns raised by these other models are beyond the scope of this
article.
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mediation freely choose to be a victim of exploitation, or to alert that
party to overreaching. The attorney may not be prepared to face the
tough ethical choices which go with advising one party to terminate an
unbalanced mediation or allowing a compromise to develop that is not
entirely fair to both parties. 9 The quandary intensifies when one considers the attorney-mediator's own (possibly unconscious) desire, for
personal or financial reasons, to keep a tenuous mediation process
from breaking down.
Crouch criticized the concept of "dual representation," which is
found in much of the "rhetoric" favoring divorce mediation. 0 He
noted that the dual representation concept often leads to the erroneous assumption that the attorney-mediator represents the interests of
each party to the mediation against the other. However, mediation by
an impartial attorney has nothing to do with "representation" in this
sense. The lawyer who mediates is more akin to an impartial umpire
and discussion leader than an advocate. To avoid confusion, Crouch
suggested that the attorney inform the parties to the mediation that
no attorney-client relationship has been formed and that the mediation service is not that which a lawyer in the adversarial system traditionally provides."' Nevertheless, even with a disclaimer, the parties
may still seek, and initially expect to receive, the modern mediation
alternative plus the traditional lawyer-client relationship. 2
Crouch's article identifies two of the most serious ethical concerns
which face the attorney-mediator: (1) conflicts of interest between the
participants, and (2) the conflict between "fairness" and "neutrality"
in mediation. To some extent, these concerns overlap. Each concerns
the attorney's duties to the mediation participants and to the mediation process. Each highlights the more basic paradigmatic predicament of how an attorney's ethical duties when mediating differ from
those imposed in the traditional adversarial context. This section focuses on these dilemmas, and offers some possible solutions for Wyoming attorneys.
B.

The Conflict-of-Interest Problem

The ethical duties of a Wyoming attorney who practices law are
measured by the familiar standards contained in the Wyoming Rules
of Professional Conduct (Rules). The Rules establish the attorney's
obligations to the client and to the justice system in a variety of practice situations.8 3 Therefore, the Rules are a logical starting-place for
79. Id.

at 33.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 34.
82. Id.
83. Section 8 of the preamble to the WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1986) states in part:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered.
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's re-

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVII

an inquiry into the conflict-of-interest problem.
1. Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7
The attorney-mediator who seeks guidance from the Rules will
very quickly run into the general conflict-of-interest rule, Rule 1.7.
The first part of the Rule states that:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client; and (2) each
84
client consents after consultation.
If divorce mediation is "representation" of both parties, this rule
sounds its death knell. Even if consent is given by both parties, the
lawyer who "represents" one party to a divorce mediation will very
rarely face a situation where it is reasonable to believe that the interests of the other participant, also his or her client, are not "adversely
affected" by the representation."5 This is one reason that the traditional ethical rule which prohibited representation of both spouses in
a divorce proceeding survives, even in an age of no-fault divorce."
Unfortunately for divorce mediation, Rule 1.7 does not define
under what circumstances a representation is created. The Scope to
the Rules states that "for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to
these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists." 81
At present, Wyoming has no authority defining the divorce mediator's
role as non-representational. The ethical danger for the attorney-mediator is that an attorney-client relationship may be created by implication.88 Thus, the attorney-mediator could unintentionally run afoul
of Rule 1.7 by "representing" opposing parties whose interests cannot
reasonably be protected by one attorney. Possible solutions to this
problem are discussed later in this section.

sponsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.
84. Id., Rule 1.7(a).
85. See infra notes 91, 96-98.
86. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61
TEX. L. REV. 211, 247 (1982) [hereinafter Moore]. See also, Linda J. Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. at 107, 109-10
(1982): "[Rlepresentation of both spouses in a matrimonial action has traditionally
been viewed as being so inherently prejudicial that dual representation is always
prohibited."
87. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (1986).
88. Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo. 1978). Whether such a representation is created depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Chavez v. State,
604 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/8

16

Gibbard and Hartmeister: Mediation and Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases - Practical Consid
1992

MEDIATION

2.

Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 2.2

One might think that Rule 2.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, concerning "intermediation," would supply an answer
to the conflict-of-interest problem. It appears to be drafted with dispute resolution proceedings conducted by a single attorney in mind.
However, in the case of divorce mediation, Rule 2.2 fails to solve the
conflict-of-interest problem raised in Rule 1.7 or to give the attorney
pertinent, applicable ethical guidance in how to conduct a divorce mediation. 9 Rule 2.2 brings attorney-conducted "intermediation" under
professional discipline by governing the attorney's conduct when he
mediates between clients. However, the rule probably does not even
apply to divorce mediation. Furthermore, commentators who have attempted to apply Rule 2.2 to divorce mediation have roundly criticized its "dual representation" approach.
Does rule 2.2 apply to create binding rules for divorce mediation?
The probable answer is "no." Several factors support this conclusion.
First, the rule does not appear to have been drafted with divorce mediation in mind. The Kutak Commission, which drafted Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 2.2,9o included a provision for divorce mediation in some of the early drafts of commentary to Rule 2.2, but deleted it from the final version.9 This suggests an intent of the drafters
to exclude divorce mediation from Rule 2.2.
Second, the official commentary to Rule 2.2 notes that the rule
does not apply when the lawyer acts as an arbitrator or mediator between parties who are not the lawyer's clients.2 As will be discussed
89. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if: (1) the lawyer consults
with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client
privileges, and obtains each clients' consent to the common representation; (2) the
lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible
with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately
informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice
to the interest of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful,

and (3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them,
so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so request, or if
any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is [sic] no longer satisfied. Upon
withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the
matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
90. Adopted in Wyoming as WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2

in 1986.
91. Andrew S. Morrison, Is Divorce Mediation the Practice of Law? A Matter of
Perspective, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1143 (1987), citing Silberman, supra note 86, at 121
[hereinafter Morrison].
92. The Official Commentary states as follows:
[t]he Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or
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below, the only truly practical and ethical way an attorney can conduct divorce mediation is by this "non-representational approach."
Divorce mediation conducted without representation is thus expressly
excluded from Rule 2.2. Instead, Rule 2.2 contemplates a scheme of
"common representation" in which the attorney represents both parties to the mediation.9 3
Third, Rule 2.2 prohibits "intermediation" when the mediation
involves "contentious negotiations.""" Divorce mediation probably
qualifies per se as "contentious negotiation" which bars mediation
under Rule 2.2."'
Commentators and bar opinions which have considered whether a
common representation approach, such as that contained in Rule 2.2,
should apply to divorce mediation have been sharply critical of common representation" because of the ethical difficulties involved in
"representing" both parties to the mediation. 7 The protections built
into Rule 2.2 will usually not be sufficient to resolve the inherent conflict-of-interest problems which common representation presents. In a
common representation, the lawyer theoretically owes both parties a
duty of confidentiality" and loyal and diligent representation. 9 These
among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been
appointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for
Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association. WYOMING RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2, Official Commentary.

93. "A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents
two (2) or more parties with conflicting interests." Id.
94. Id.
95. Morrison, supra note 91, at 1141. There has been some discussion, however, of
whether divorce proceedings involve an actual, or only a potential conflict of interest.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1244, 1311 (1981) for a discussion of "actual" versus "potential" conflict
in the divorce situation. For an argument that absence of "conflict-in-fact," without
more, does not justify joint representation. See Moore, supra note 86, at 250.
96. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 219, 235 (1982) (notes commentators and bar associations which have taken the
position that divorce mediation is inappropriate because of the high level of conflict).
Moore, supra note 86, notes that for this same reason, mediation has won only "reluctant" approval from bar associations. See also Wendy Woods, Comment, Model Rule
2.2 and Divorce Mediation: Ethics Guideline or Ethics Gap?, 65 WASH. U.LQ 227 n.
27 (1987); Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 329, 341-42 (1984).
97. Note also, as previously mentioned, supra note 84 and accompanying text,
that WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 permits dual representation if

the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the parties consent to the representation.
Divorce mediation will rarely, if ever, meet the first of these criteria.
98. "Common-representation" divorce mediation also creates a problem with attorney-client privilege. Because privileged information has been discussed in front of
the "adverse" party, the privilege is waived if the divorce is later contested. See
Moore, supra note 86, at 233, n.223, and authorities cited therein. This problem has
been addressed in Wyoming by WYo. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Supp. 1991). See supra note 8.
99. The Official Commentary to Rule 2.2 states that "[clommon representation
does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship. Each client
has the right to loyal and diligent representation ...
"
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duties conflict when the parties' interests are as diametrically opposed
as in most divorce situations. The difficulties this conflict poses for
the attorney have been recognized in the statement that the attorney
''owes no actionable duty to an adverse party emanating from the
zealous representation of his own client"' 10 and that any infringement
on this rule "results in an irreconcilable conflict of interest working
extreme violence to the adversarial system as we know it. '' l °l Although
divorce mediation is not part of the "adversarial system as we know
it," the attorney who chooses to follow established ethical principles
still faces the conflict created by an undivided duty of loyalty to each
of his "clients."
Therefore, Rule 2.2 does not resolve the conflict-of-interest problem the attorney faces when mediating a domestic relations dispute.
The "common representation" scheme in Rule 2.2 is clearly inappropriate for the divorce mediation context.
C.

Possible Solutions to the Problem

At least two solutions to the conflict-of-interest problem have
been proposed. First, it has been proposed that mediation not be considered the practice of law subject to the Rules at all, and second, that
the attorney who mediates not be considered to "represent" the
parties.
1. Exempt Mediation by an Attorney from the Rules
It has been proposed that if mediation were excluded from the
practice of law, or otherwise exempted from the Rules, this might
solve the conflict-of-interest problem contained in Rule 1.7.102 How100. Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990). The facts alleged by the
plaintiffs in this case, which was decided on summary judgment for the defendant,
show the dangers under existing ethical principles for the non-represented party in a
contractual transaction. These alleged facts were as follows: Brooks was a widow with
little business acumen who was under a great deal of stress after her husband died.
Zebre represented the Arambels, neighbors of Mrs. Brooks, who sought to lease the
Brooks' ranch with an option to purchase. Zebre met with Brooks and the Arambels
and prepared a lease contract for the ranch, without the attorney for the estate being
present. After the contract was later declared unconscionable and was rescinded,
Brooks and the Bank, co-trustees of the Brooks' marital trust, sued Zebre for breach of
his ethical duties to Brooks as an adverse party. The Wyoming Supreme Court held
that no cause of action for negligence exists against an attorney for an adversary, and
that no private cause of action in favor of a non-client exists for violations of attorney
disciplinary rules. Id., at 201. Justice Urbigkit dissented. He characterized the contractual transaction as non-adversarial because only one attorney directed the events;
"[slince Zebre undertook to advise, direct and control the negotiations, he assumed
responsibility to both parties." Id., at 221 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent

Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986, 1015 (1985) [hereinafter Purnell]; Morrison, supra note 91, at 1120. Morrison does not take the position that mediation should
not be considered the practice of law; in fact, quite the contrary. However, his article
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ever, divorce mediation seems so closely related to other functions
conducted by attorneys that the Rules should probably apply.
Several factors support the position that no blanket exemption
from the Rules should be made for divorce mediation. First, the attorney utilizes many of the same skills which are required in ordinary
law practice when performing the two basic functions of a mediator:
(1) facilitating communication between the parties to help them reach
an agreement, and (2) making substantive contributions to the decision-making process. ' Second, it is unlikely that an attorney who
mediates will conduct the mediation without reference to his or her
knowledge of family law. Indeed, a principal advantage of having an
attorney involved in divorce mediation is that the parties will be able
to negotiate with full knowledge of the legal issues involved in divorce.' 0 4 Finally, as previously noted,' 0 5 the member of the public who
comes to an attorney, even when that attorney is acting as a mediator,
expects to receive the services of an attorney. While the attorney-mediator cannot offer "joint representation," to meet public expectations, he or she should at least be bound by the ethical standards of
his or her profession.
For the reasons given, mediation conducted by an attorney should
be considered the practice of law. This raises another concern: is the
practice of divorce mediation by a non-attorney the unauthorized
practice of law?"' This is a thorny question, particularly since
mental-health professionals have been performing divorce mediation
for years.' 7
Policy reasons certainly militate against barring non-lawyers from
can be read to suggest that if divorce mediation is not the practice of law, this might
solve the conflict-of-interest problem under the Rules.
It should be noted that an attorney must comply with some disciplinary standards
even outside the practice of law. See, e.g., WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 8.4, Official Commentary, which states that lawyers holding positions of public or
private trust assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. See
also DISCIPLINARY CODE FOR THE WYOMING STATE BAR, RULE II, which states that an
attorney has a duty to conduct him or herself according to the standards imposed
upon members of the bar, both personally and professionally.
103. These functions are identified in Purnell, supra note 102, at 1004-05.
104. See Moore, supra note 86, at 252-53 (1982).
105. Crouch, supra note 77. Morrison, supra note 91, at 1114-15, identifies values
which drive the inquiry into whether an attorney is engaged in the practice of law. The
chief concern is whether an attorney's conduct should be made to conform to the applicable code of legal ethics. Supervision, in the case of mediation, protects the public
from danger that the practice of mediation will inadequately protect the interests of
the participants. It also protects the reputation of the local bar and the legal profession. Morrison concludes that these values favor seeing divorce mediation as the practice of law.
106. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW OF THE STATE OF

11(b) (1989): "Only active members of the Wyoming State Bar
shall engage in the practice of law within this state .... "
107. For a discussion of the Single Mental Health Professional Mediator, see Silberman, supra note 86, at 123-28.
WYOMING (BAR RULES)
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performing divorce mediation. The particular training which a
mental-health professional brings to the mediation is often beneficial
to the participants' understanding of themselves and their dispute.
Furthermore, the attorney may benefit from the participation of
mental-health professionals in mediation in the form of a lawyer-therapist team. If such a team arrangement is ethically permitted, the
therapist can often express understanding of a participant's emotions
and feelings, which the lawyer is not trained to do and may not be
comfortable doing. 0 8 Even working alone, the mental-health professional can use his or her training to help the parties reach a mutuallyacceptable agreement. 10 9
One commentator suggests that although the relevant values
favor seeing an attorney's conduct in mediating a divorce as the practice of law subject to professional discipline, other relevant values
favor permitting divorce mediation by non-attorneys.1 0 Divorce mediation by an attorney could be treated as the practice of law, but the
same mediation by a layperson would not be unauthorized practice of
law. The non-attorney mediator could be licensed and trained to deal
with legal issues which are incidental to the divorce mediation process."' Settlement agreements drawn up by a non-attorney mediator
could receive mandatory review by a licensed attorney or by a district
court. The advantage of this suggested approach is that it preserves
the best of both worlds: the attorney who mediates is treated as an
attorney, but the mediator from another profession is not.
In any case, an attorney who mediates a divorce is practicing law,
and no exception should be made. Making divorce mediation something besides the practice of law is an inadequate solution to the conflict-of-interest problem. However, it contains the seed of a promising
idea: that the attorney-mediator should be treated differently than
the attorney-practitioner with respect to certain ethical obligations.
This idea will be developed further in Section V on the proposed
Standards of Practice.
2.

Declare Mediation "Non-Representational"

The conflicts in the divorce context have led many commentators
on divorce mediation to propose a non-representational model in
which the attorney represents neither party."' As noted above, this
108. Forest S. Mosten & Barbara E. Biggs, The Role of the Therapist in the Co-

Mediation of Divorce: An Exploration by a Lawyer-Mediator Team, 9 J.

DIVORCE

27,

31 (1985).

109. Silberman, supra note 86, at 127.
110. Morrison, supra note 91, at 1155. The values Morrison identifies are (1) ensuring the adequate ability of the practitioner; (2) ensuring the morally sound character of the practitioner; (3) guaranteeing the opportunity for responsible supervision
over the process; and (4) maximizing the availability to the public of efficient services.
111. Silberman, supra note 86, at 128.
112. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 96, at 225.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVII

type of mediation is expressly excluded from the terms of Rule 2.2.

13

Yet, the "non-representational" model presents several ethical
difficulties of its own."" First and foremost, because the attorney-client relationship is not created, the attorney is left with little ethical
guidance from the Rules to govern his or her conduct. Second," 5 each
party to the mediation may erroneously believe that the attorney represents his or her interests. One suggestion for resolving this problem
is the use of an appropriate disclaimer by the attorney which instructs
the parties that he or she represents neither of them."' This use of
disclosures is discussed further in Part V of this article.
Another ethical difficulty is presented when the attorney gives independent legal advice to one of the parties, or favors the "weaker"
party over the "stronger.""17 Even if the attorney's participation is
non-representational, this does not mean that he or she will not face
difficulties in establishing the boundaries of impartiality. This conflict
will be discussed further in the next section.
D. Neutrality versus Fairness
A concept central to the theory and practice of mediation is that
the mediator strives to be neutral as between the parties."' Although
Rule 2.2 attempts to avoid obvious conflicts of interest and appears to
be oriented toward prevention of structural bias, the rule has very little to say about the attorney's duty to maintain a neutral attitude
throughout the course of the mediation. Also, Rule 2.2 does not address the difficult conflict between neutrality and fairness which so
often arises in mediation of interpersonal disputes like divorce.
Christopher W. Moore describes the conflict between neutrality
and fairness in mediation, as follows:
By far the most difficult problem mediators face regarding power
relationships is the instance in which the discrepancy between the
113. See the Official Commentary to Rule 2.2, supra note 92.
114. These difficulties are discussed in more detail in Morrison, supra note 91, at
1120-25.
115. Crouch, supra note 77, at 34.
116. Crouch, supra note 96, at 227. Crouch expresses some doubts about the efficacy of such disclaimers if they are nothing but a "litany of legal rights and obligations
of the parties topped off with a written separation agreement."
117. The terms "strong" or "weak," as used in this article, refer to a party's ability to use the mediation process to achieve his or her goals. Interpersonal style is relevant only as it affects this outcome. Consequently, one must use terms like "weaker"
and "stronger" advisedly. A party who seems compliant rather than aggressive is not
necessarily the "weaker" party to the mediation.
When dealing with mediation participants from a different culture or ethnicity,
the mediator should be aware of cultural norms concerning expression of strong feeling
which may differ from those of the his or her own culture. See, e.g., CAROL TAVRIS.
ANGER: THE MISUNDERSTOOD EMOTION (1982).
118. Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practiceand Paradox:DeconstructingNeutrality
in Mediation, 16 L. & Soc. INQuIRY, 35, 35 (Winter 1991).
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strength of means of influence is extremely great. The mediator,
because of his or her commitment to neutrality and impartiality,
is ethically barred from direct advocacy for the weaker party, yet
is also ethically obligated to assist the parties in reaching an acceptable agreement." 9
One commentator identifies three sources of unequal bargaining
power: (1) one party may have insufficient financial resources to pursue a contested divorce; (2) the emotional vulnerability of a partner
may undercut the give-and-take process of mediation; and (3) one
party may be more anxious to settle, for whatever reason.'2 0 The commentator concludes that "if one party is at a disadvantage, whether it
be emotionally, financially,
or otherwise, the mediation will likely not
2
achieve its purposes.'1
Indeed, strict neutrality may have an adverse effect in divorce
mediation: the mediator who is "strictly neutral" may believe him or
herself to be ethically bound not to favor a party whose rights are
being trampled by the mediation process, even where the result offends the mediator's sense of fairness. A self-imposed blindness to differences between the parties in empowerment and negotiating style, if
not addressed in the mediation process, can lead to injustice for the
less adversarially-minded party.' 2
However, power imbalances between the mediating parties are inevitable.' 2 To what extent does this impose on the attorney-mediator
a duty to supervise the mediation process to insure a "fair" or "just"
result? It is noteworthy that a "fair" result, if "fairness" means equality, would not necessarily be assured if the parties went to court. A
property settlement by the court, for example, might be "unequal""'
or "disparate,"'" 9 so long as it was not "unjust or inequitable."'2 6

281-82 (1987).
120. Knuppel, supra note 61, at 131-32.
121. Id. at 132.
122. See Grillo, supra note 18, at 1603. For this reason, mediation may not be
appropriate at all in certain types of domestic disputes, such as custody mediation
where one spouse or the children have been physically abused by the other spouse. See
Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women
and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990).
123. "It is only in rare cases that each of the parties have similar applicable
knowledge and abilities." Leonard L. Loeb, Introduction to the Standards of Practice
for Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 451, 452 (1984).
124. See Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12, 16 (Wyo. 1974). The husband contested
the trial court's division of the marital property. He received some property, while the
wife was awarded the "home place." Some of the property was acquired with assistance from the wife's parents. The husband argued that under the decree, he would
receive 40.6 percent of the parties' assets, and the wife, 59.4 percent. The Wyoming
Supreme Court did not agree with his calculations, but stated that even if they were
correct, it could not be said that the trial court abused its discretion in making the
property settlement in the way it did.
125. See Cross v. Cross, 586 P.2d 547, 549 (Wyo. 1978) (statute requiring just and
equitable division of property could be complied with even by disparate property division when all statutory factors are taken into account).
119. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROcEss
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Courts do not normally concern themselves with the relative empowerment of the parties who appear before them. It must be asked
whether the mediator has a greater duty than does the divorce court
to insure a fair result.
The mediator may claim that he or she is held to a higher standard than the court because of the goals and aspirations of the mediation process. However, one of these aspirations must surely be to facilitate the parties in reaching their goals for the mediation. Isn't the
essence of neutrality in the mediation context not to force the mediator's own viewpoint on the parties? If the parties are willing to agree
to an "unfair" agreement, is it not paternalistic for the mediator to
exercise a veto power over what the parties have chosen? 2 7
The answer appears to require a compromise between allowing
the parties to reach an agreement which suits them and balancing the
parties' strengths. It must be remembered that the mediator's principal duty is to assure the integrity of the mediation process, rather
than to strive for a particular result. This may require "empowering"
the weaker party to assure that both parties have an equal opportunity to participate in the mediation."' In cases where one party is
abusing the mediation, the attorney may even need to advise the
other party to terminate the mediation. However, if the parties have
reached an "unfair" but legally valid settlement after a mediation
with "integrity," the mediator has done his or her job and should not
second-guess the parties' agreement.
Neither Rule 1.7 nor Rule 2.2 is of much help to the attorneymediator who seeks to conform his or her conduct to ethical guidelines. A model in which the attorney represents neither party to the
mediation, while still problematic, is preferable to Rule 2.2's "common
representation" approach. In conducting the mediation, the attorneymediator must strike a balance between personal neutrality and advocacy for the less-adversarial party. Supplementary rules, perhaps
binding on attorney-mediators and non-attorney mediators alike, are
needed to set out the mediator's duties to the mediating parties.

V.

THE STANDARDS OF PRACTICE

Part IV of this article discussed a few of the ethical implications
of attorney-conducted divorce mediation. The Rules of Professional
Conduct were shown to be inadequate when applied to the divorce
126. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1987) states in part: "In granting a divorce, the court
shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable
127. For the view that a mediator who seeks a "fair" result may violate his or her
duty of neutrality, see Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A
Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT L. REV 85, 86-87 (1981).
128. Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1981).
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mediation context. However, this does not mean that the attorneymediator must be left without ethical standards by which to guide his
or her conduct during the mediation. The American Bar Association
has recognized the particular needs of the divorce mediation practitioner and has addressed them in proposed standards of practice. At
the present time, Wyoming has not adopted these standards, but
could do so as a special supplement to the Rules of Professional
Responsibility.
In August, 1984, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved the Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in
Family Disputes (Standards).12 9 The Preamble to the Standards sets
forth the requirements the delegates felt necessary for family mediation to succeed: (1) the mediator must be qualified by "training, experience, and temperament;" (2) the mediator must be impartial; (3) the
participants must reach decisions voluntarily; (4) the decision must be
made on sufficient factual data; and (5) each participant
must under30
stand the information on which decisions are reached.1
The precatory language of the preamble hopefully prevents the
overall aims of the section from being lost in the technical requirements of the Standards. As one commentator notes,
By listing these qualities in a preamble, the Section has expressed
its belief that for the process to be ethical, its promises must be
kept. Thus, a mediation which is not truly consensual, or which
produces decisions not based on information and understanding,
or decisions not voluntarily made, would be below the
Standards.'3 1
A.

Standard I: Duty of Disclosure

The first standard requires the mediator to describe the process
of mediation to the parties before they reach an agreement to mediate. Specifically, the mediator should describe the difference between
mediation and other means of conflict resolution to the participants. 132 Whereas the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct require
only that the attorney "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation," 3 ' the Standards require the attorney to inform the
participants about the process of the mediation itself, and specifically
about certain key areas of concern. Thus, the mediator must inform

129. Morrison, supra note 91, at 1144.
130. ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES,
Preamble (1984) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
131. Thomas A. Bishop, The Standards of Practicefor Family Mediators: An Individual Interpretationand Comments, 17 FAM. L.Q. 461, 463 (1984).
132. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard I-A.
133. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
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the parties that he or she will make suggestions for the parties to consider, but that all decisions are to be made by the participants themselves; 34 that either the participants or the mediator has the right to
36
suspend or terminate the process at any time;1 that each participant
advice throughout the
for
counsel
legal
should employ independent
mediation process; 3 6 that the mediator cannot represent either or
3 7
that the
both of them in a marital dissolution or in any legal action;
party durany
or
with
mediator may meet alone with either of them
ing the course of the mediation;' and that emotions [of the parties]
play a part in the decision-making process." 9 The detailed requirement of specific disclosure recognizes the participants' crucial involvement in the success of the mediation, and the mediator's role to en10
It
lighten the parties rather than hide behind the "legal persona."
also attempts to defuse any unreasonable expectations the parties
may have of the mediation.
Additional disclosure requirements involve feedback from the
participants as part of the mediation process. The mediator and the
participants must agree on the mediator's duties and responsibilities.' 4 ' The mediator must seek an agreement with the participants
which spells out under what circumstances the mediator will meet
alone with either party or with third parties." 2 The mediator must
also elicit from the parties a confirmation that each understands the
connection between his or her own emotions and the bargaining
process." 3
Finally, Standard I requires the mediator to explain the fee for
the mediation.' 4 ' This parallels Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(b), which requires the attorney to communicate the basis or rate of his or her fee." 5 Standard I-F also provides that it is
"inappropriate for the mediator to charge a contingency fee or to base
46
Obviously, a methe fee on the outcome of the mediation process.""1
of success for one
a
measure
her
fee
on
his
or
diator cannot condition
party, without violating his or her duty of impartiality to the other
134. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard I-C.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at Standard
Id. at Standard
Id.
Id. at Standard
Id. at Standard

I-A.
I-C.
I-H.
I-I.

140. See generally James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA L REv. 735 (1978).
141. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard I-D.
142. Id. at Standarrd I-H.

143. Id. at Standard I-I.
144. Id. at Standard I-F. Compare the provisions of amended Wyo. R. Civ. P.
40(d), see supra note 49.
145. WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (1986): "When the
lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be
communicated to the client before or within a reasonable time after commencing the
representation."

146.

STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,

supra note 130, at Standard I-F.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/8

26

Gibbard and Hartmeister: Mediation and Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases - Practical Consid
1992

MEDIATION

party. More importantly, this rule plays an important part in preventing overreaching in the mediation process. By detaching the mediator
from a financial stake in the success of the mediation, the rule assists
him or her in terminating mediation if it becomes necessary.
On the subject of terminating the mediation, Standard I-E states
that the mediator "has a continuing duty to assess his or her own
ability and willingness to undertake mediation with the particular
participants and the issues to be mediated."'"" The mediator must
terminate mediation if it appears that 1"one
of the parties is not able
48
or willing to participate in good faith.
B.

Standard II: Confidentiality

Standard II provides that the mediator "shall not voluntarily disclose information obtained through the mediation process without the
prior consent of both participants.' 1 The provisions of this standard
complement the new Wyoming Statutes on mediation. Whereas the
standard makes no provisions for disclosures necessary in furtherance
of the mediation process,"' section 1-43-102 of the Wyoming Statutes
expressly provides that: "[a]ny communication is confidential if not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the mediation process or those reasona15
bly necessary for the transformation of the communication.'
Whereas Standard II is nearly silent about the substantive law of
privilege," 2 Wyoming Statutes section 1-43-103 explicitly sets forth its
parameters (see Appendix A for text of the statute).'
C.

Standard III: Impartiality

Standard III is perhaps the most important of the Standards in
relation to the ethical issues raised thus far in this article. It simply
states that "[tihe mediator has a duty to be impartial."' 4 Standard
III-A further provides that "[t]he mediator shall not represent either
party during or after the mediation process in any legal matters. In
the event the mediator has represented one of the parties beforehand,
147. Id. at Standard I-E.
148. Id.
149. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard II.
150. Compare WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1986), which
exempts from non-disclosure those disclosures "that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation."
151. WYo. STAT. § 1-43-102 (Supp. 1991); see 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 217, § 2.
152. The Standard Subsections hint at privilege in their requirement that the mediator notify the participants immediately if he or she is called upon to testify, so that
the participants may seek to quash the process. Standard II-B. Standard Il-C further
provides that the mediator notify the participants of his or her inability to bind third
parties to an agreement not to disclose information furnished during the mediation in
the absence of any absolute privilege.
153. WYo. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Supp. 1991).
154. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard III.
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the mediator shall not undertake the mediation."' 5
This important provision erects a barrier between the attorney's
law practice and his or her mediation practice. It makes explicit the
concept that the attorney involved in mediation represents neither
party. However, it also makes clear that in the interest of mediator
neutrality some conflict-of-interest principles remain applicable. The
subsections of Standard III explain that the mediator must be "impartial" as between the mediation participants. In response to the
question of whether impartiality means passive neutrality or active
balancing of power, Standard III-C provides that "[t]he mediator's
task is to facilitate the ability of the participants to negotiate their
own agreement, while raising questions as to the fairness, equity and
feasibility of proposed options for settlement."'' 6 Thus, considerations
of neutrality and fairness are both addressed, in much the same manner as was previously suggested in Part IV. This compromise method
appears to be the best approach anyone has developed thus far for
dealing with the impartiality problem.
The problem of the "best interests of children" in mediation was
raised earlier in Part III of this article. Standard III-D requires the
mediator to ensure that the participants consider fully the best interests of the children.' 57 If the mediator does not believe that the proposed agreement protects the children's best interests, the mediator
must notify the parties of his or her belief.1 58 This provision is important for two reasons: first, because as noted earlier, the children are
usually not parties to the mediation and the mediator must be aware
that their best interests may differ from those of the mediation participants; and second, because any court order accepting the parties'
agreement requires a finding that it operates in the children's best
interests.
Standard III-E provides that the mediator may communicate
with either party alone or with any third party to discuss mediation
issues only if he has the consent of the mediation participants. 59 This
prohibition on ex parte contacts is similar to that required of judges
by the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct."" However, in the case of
mediation, the element of "consent of the parties" assumes a much
larger role in determining when the mediator may speak with a single
party or the party's attorney.
155. Id. at Standard III-A.
156. Id. at Standard III-C.
157. Id. at Standard III-D.
158. Id.
159. Id. at Standard III-E.
160. THE WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3, part A.7 (1990) states in
part that "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or
consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties
concerning a pending or impending proceeding" except under certain, narrowly-defined circumstances.
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Standard IV: Disclosure of Information

In order for the mediation process to be an effective alternative to
the adversarial system, there must be some mechanism by which the
information which is normally disclosed in discovery is made available
to the participants. Standard IV requires the mediator to insure that
this information is developed in the mediation.' Additionally, it requires the mediator to "promote the equal understanding of such information before any agreement if reached.1 162 Thus, the mediator
plays the role of explaining relevant information to the parties that
their lawyers or a judge might have played in the adversarial system.
Standard IV also requires the mediator to "assure that the participants have a sufficient understanding of appropriate statutory and
case law as well as local judicial tradition."' 63 The mediator is to provide this assurance by recommending to the participants that they
seek independent legal representation before reaching an agreement.'" 4 The duty of informing the parties that they should seek
outside counsel is more thoroughly discussed in Standard VI.
E.

Standard V: Termination of Mediation

In Part IV, D of this article, the mediator's duty to protect the
mediation process by empowering the "weaker" party was briefly discussed. Standard V sets out detailed rules which inform the mediator
how to protect the integrity of the process.
Standard V-A provides that the mediator may suspend or terminate mediation if he or she believes that the participants are unable or
unwilling to "meaningfully participate" in the process, or that a reasonable agreement is unlikely.166 The text does not define what a "reasonable" agreement is, or how it differs from a "fair" agreement. The
best reading of this requirement seems to be that if one or both parties' positions are so polarized that a reasonable compromise is unlikely, the mediator may suspend or terminate mediation.
Standard V-B provides that the mediator insure that the parties
understand fully the implications and ramifications of all the available
options. 66 This would seem to require the attorney-mediator to explain to each party their legal rights. The mediator may also have a
duty to explain the tax consequences of the suggested agreement.
The attorney contemplating mediation may ask whether an attorney-mediator who fails to advise the parties of some legal entitlement
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

Standard IV-B.
Standard IV-C.

supra note 130, at Standard IV.

Standard V-A.
Standard V-B.
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may be liable for malpractice. As noted earlier, Wyoming's new statutes provide for mediator immunity for civil liability for good faith
acts or omissions. 167 Also, since the Standards require the attorney8
mediator to refer the participants to independent counsel," and since
the attorney-mediator does not represent either of the parties, the answer would seem to be "no." This resolves a serious dilemma of the
common representation approach: the attorney-mediator had to advise his or her client of the entitlements due the client, but could not
ethically do so if it injured the other party to the mediation.
Standard V-C requires the attorney-mediator to "assure
anced dialogue" and to attempt to defuse any "manipulative or
9
idating negotiation techniques" used by either participant."
actions by the attorney-mediator serve to protect the integrity
mediation, discussed above in Part IV of this article.
F.

a balintimThese
of the

Standard VI: Independent Counsel

Standard VI provides that the mediator "has a continuing duty to
advise each of the mediation participants to obtain legal review prior
to reaching any agreement."' 70 This requirement is a logical concomitant of the non-representational approach. Since the mediator does
not represent the parties, the parties need to obtain independent
counsel to protect their individual interests. Standard VI recognizes
that the mediator cannot insist that each party have individual counsel, " 1 but it requires the mediator to strongly recommend to the parties that each employ independent counsel throughout the mediation
process. 7" It is questionable whether this is always a desirable practice, since the cost of the mediation will be greatly increased if each
party employs his or her own attorney in addition to the attorneymediator. It seems more realistic to require only that each party obtain counsel to review the written agreement reached via the mediation process. Most importantly, this Standard puts responsibility for
the legal consequences of the final agreement on the parties and their
independent counsel rather than on the mediator.
G.

Enforcement of the Standards

If the Standards are adopted, a provision should be included to
the effect that the Standards will be enforced by the Bar Disciplinary
Committee in order to give them enforceable effect under professional
discipline.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See supra note 9.
See discussion of Standard VI, infra.
Id. at Standard VI-C.
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 130, at Standard V1.
Id. at Standard IV-D.
Id. at Standard VI-A.
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Experience with the "Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes" (Labor Arbitration Code)
in the labor arbitration context suggests that the Standards of Practice are not likely to be effective unless a clear-cut enforcement procedure is provided. Although aggrieved parties can seek redress for Labor Arbitration Code violations with the National Academy of
Arbitrators' Committee on Professional Responsibility and Grievances, in the more than thirty years of the Code's existence, only one
formal action has ever been filed with the Committee. 1 " This may be
attributed to the Labor Arbitration Code's failure to provide for an
effective procedure for handling complaints within the Code itself." '
To avoid confusion, the Standards of Practice, if adopted, should
explicitly provide for attorney discipline by the disciplinary committee. The following sentence might be added to Rule 8.4 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct:
[It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:]
(g) violate the Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in
Family Disputes when engaged in domestic relations mediation.
In summary, the Standards of Practice are a thorough, useful and
carefully considered attempt to define and resolve ethical issues relating to divorce mediation. They deal with the problem of conflict of
interest by adopting a non-representational approach. They deal with
the conflict between neutrality and fairness by providing for both impartiality and effective mediator input into the mediation process.
Wyoming should adopt the Standards as a special supplement to the
Rules of Professional Responsibility. Enforcement of the ethical violations of the provisions should be assigned to the Bar Disciplinary
Committee. A modified version of the Standards might be made applicable to non-attorney mediators through a special licensing program.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mediation presents an opportunity to resolve certain aspects of
domestic disputes outside the traditional, adversarial system. Domestic disputes are often characterized by the existence of highly emotional and/or contentious relationships between the parties and the
complexities created therefrom. While mediation will not completely
eliminate the role of the judiciary in domestic cases, it may serve to
reduce acrimony between the parties and minimize the time and dollars spent to reach a workable resolution.
It is recognized that this article raises questions about domestic
mediation that it does not answer. No apologies are made for doing so.
173. See Joseph Krislor, Disciplining Arbitrator Misconduct: Should the Academy Adopt the Judicial Machinery?, 41 LABOR L.J. 431, 432 (1990).
174. Id. at 433-34.
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Mediation has potential as an alternative form of non-adversarial dispute resolution, and, in some ways, is particularly appropriate in the
domestic relations context. However, before that potential can be
tapped, unresolved practical and ethical questions must be addressed.
Only then can mediation become a truly useful and viable dispute resolution alternative in Wyoming.
The Wyoming Legislature and Wyoming Supreme Court have recently taken modest affirmative steps to facilitate the development of
and encourage the use of mediation practices. Within the narrow field
of domestic mediation, however, the potential for serious ethical
problems concerning conflicts of interest and neutrality has not yet
been confronted. The Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct do not
provide answers to all of the possible dilemmas created for the Wyoming attorney-mediator. Consequently, Wyoming should consider
adopting the Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family
Disputes. Further, the Wyoming State Bar should assist in enforcing
the Standards adopted and in informing Bar members and the citizens of Wyoming of the merits and drawbacks of divorce mediation.
APPENDIX

A:

WYOMING MEDIATION ACT

WYo.

STAT.

§ 1-43-101 (1991) provides:

(a) As used in this act:
(i) "Communication" means any item of information disclosed during the mediation process through files, reports, interviews, discussions, memoranda, case summaries, notes, work
products of the mediator, or any other item of information disclosed during the mediation, whether oral or written;
(ii) "Mediation" means a process in which an impartial third
person facilitates communication between two (2) or more parties
in conflict to promote reconciliation, settlement, compromise or
understanding;
(iii) "Mediator" means an impartial third person not involved in the conflict, dispute or situation who engages in
mediation;
(iv) "Party to the mediation" means a person who is involved
in the conflict, dispute or situation and is rendered mediation services by a mediator or consults a mediator with a view to obtaining mediation services;
(v) "Representative of the mediator" means a person employed by the mediator to assist in the rendition of mediation
services;
(vi) "Representative of the party" means a person having authority to obtain mediation services on behalf of the party to the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/8
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mediation or to the act on advice rendered by the mediator;
(vii) "This act" means W.S. 1-43-101 through 1-43-104.
WYO. STAT. §

1-43-102 (1991) provides:

Any communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
furtherance of the mediation process or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
WYO. STAT. §

1-43-103 (1991) provides:

(a) A party to the mediation has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent all mediation participants from disclosing
confidential communications.
(b) The privilege under this section may be claimed by a representative of the party or by a party, his guardian or conservator,
the personal representative of a deceased party, or the successor,
trustee or similar representative of a corporation, association, or
other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who
was the mediator may claim the privilege but only on behalf of
the party. The mediator's authority to do so is presumed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
(c) There is no privilege under this section if any one (1) of
the following conditions is met:
(i) All the parties involved provide written consent to
disclose;
(ii) The communication involves the contemplation of a future crime or harmful act;
(iii) The communication indicates that a minor child has
been or is the suspected victim of child abuse as defined by
local statute;
(iv) The communication was otherwise discoverable prior to
the mediation;
(v) One of the parties seeks judicial enforcement of the mediated agreement.
WYo.

STAT.

§ 1-43-104 (1991) provides:

Mediators are immune from civil liability for any good faith
act or omission within the scope of the performance of their
power and duties.

RULE

Rule 40,

40

APPENDIX B:
WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial or alternative dispute
resolution.
(b) Limited assignment for alternative dispute resolution. The court may, or at the request of all parties shall, assign the
case to another active judge or to a retired judge, retired justice,
or other qualified person on limited assignment for the purpose of
invoking nonbinding alternative dispute resolution methods, including settlement conference and mediation. By agreement, the
parties may select the person to conduct the settlement conference or to serve as the mediator. If the parties are unable to
agree, they may advise the court of their recommendations, and
the court shall then appoint a person to conduct the settlement
conference or to serve as the mediator. A settlement conference or
mediation may be conducted in accordance with procedures prescribed by the person conducting the settlement conference or
mediation. A mediation also may be conducted in accordance
with the following recommended rules of procedure:
(1) Prior to the session, the mediator may require confidential ex parte written submissions from each party. Those
submissions should include each party's honest assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of the case with regard to
liability, damages, and other relief, a history of all settlement offers and counteroffers in the case, an honest statement from plaintiff's counsel of the minimum settlement authority that plaintiff's counsel has or is able to obtain, and
an honest statement from defense counsel of the maximum
settlement authority that defense counsel has or is able to
obtain.
(2) Prior to the session, a commitment must be obtained from the parties that their representatives at the session have full and complete authority to represent them and
to settle the case. If any party's representative lacks settlement authority, the session should not proceed. The mediator may also require the presence at the session of the parties themselves.
(3) The mediator may begin the session by stating the
objective, which is to seek a workable resolution that is in
the best interests of all involved and that is fair and acceptable to the parties. The parties should be informed of statutory provisions governing mediation, including provisions relating to confidentiality, privilege, and immunity.
(4) Each party or attorney may then make an opening
statement stating the party's case in its best light, the issues
involved, supporting law, prospects for success, and the
party's evaluation of the case.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/8
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(5) Each party or attorney may then respond to the
other's presentation. From time to time, the parties and
their attorneys may confer privately. The mediator may adjourn the session for short periods of time. After a full, open
discussion, the mediator may summarize, identify the strong
and weak points in each case, point out the risks of trial to
each party, suggest a probable verdict or judgment range,
and suggest a fair settlement of the case. This may be done
in the presence of all parties or separately. If settlement results, it should promptly be reduced to a writing executed
by the settling parties. The mediator may suggest to the
parties such reasonable additions or requirements as may be
appropriate or beneficial in a particular case.
(c) Registry of names. - The clerk of the supreme court
shall maintain a registry of the names of retired judges and justices and other qualified persons who are available to accept limited assignments of cases under this rule.
(d) Fees and costs. - For those cases filed in court and assigned for settlement conference or mediation, the parties shall
pay no additional fee or costs. A person other than an active
judge conducting a settlement conference or serving as a mediator
shall be compensated from available public funds for services performed in a particular case at a rate of not less than $50.00 per
hour. The person to be compensated shall submit to the clerk of
the supreme court a statement of fees for services rendered, together with the report required by subsection (e).
Settlement conference or mediation is available under this
rule to persons regardless of whether suit has been filed. For
those cases not filed in court, but having been assigned and accepted for settlement conference or mediation, a filing fee of
$15.00 shall be paid to the clerk of the supreme court. Compensation for services in these cases shall be arranged by agreement
between the parties and the person conducting the settlement
conference or serving as the mediator, and that person's statement shall be paid within 30 days of receipt by the parties.
(e) Report of disposition of cases. - A report as to whether a
settlement conference or mediation pursuant to this rule resulted
in settlement shall be submitted by the person conducting the
settlement conference or serving as the mediator to the clerk of
the supreme court within 15 days of final disposition.
(f) Other forms of alternative dispute resolution. - Nothing
in this rule is intended to preclude the parties from agreeing to
submit their dispute to other forms of alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration and summary jury trial.
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